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ABSTRACT
This thesis culminates in a management plan for determining the
effects of combat stress on the man-machine interface of complex
information display systems. The objective is to provide to the reader
both background information detailing the historical development of military
attitudes towards combat stress and a survey of the physiological and
psychological factors which influence tVe resolution of this problem.
Current research in these areas is discussed with emphasis on research
which strongly supports the problem's resolution. The management plan
cites those agencies who have a specific background, expertise and
capability of accomplishing portions of the research. For concepts
requiring further study, individuals within es-tablished institutions who are
currently addressing these areas are suggested. An overall program
coordinator is recommended. In conclusibn, recommendations for
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I. INTRODUCTION
The stress of war tries men as no other test that they have
encountered in civilized life. Like a crucial experiment it exposes the
underlying physiological and psychological mechanisms of the human
being. (Grinker, 1945, p. ix)
A. PURPOSE
This thesis is a response to the same topic posed by Capt Tony
Merrill, USN, PACOM/LANTCOM Division, J-8, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Due to
the complex nature of determining the effect of combat stress on the man-
machine interface of complex information display systems and the state of
current technology and research in the associated fields, this thesis does
not attempt to resolve the stress oriented question itself. Rather, this
thesis culminates in a management plan to facilitate determination of the
larger issue of the effects of combat strevis.
The management plan orients the user towards those areas of research
requiring further study while highlighting those governmental and private
sector agencies which have accomplished in-depth research in pertinent
fields. The author's hypotheses projecting causal relationships are detailed
in this analysis. This thesis is meant to be informative in nature and not
a critique' of any management plans currently being developed by other
governmental agencies.
B. STRUCTURE
This thesis is divided into seven component parts• this Introduction,
Background, Physiological Considerations of Man-machine Interaction,
Summary of Research on Psychological Human Factors, Human Factors
Influencing Cognition and Decision- Making, Evaluation of Human Factors
Military Standards and Acquisition Policies for Automated Data Processing
Equipment (ADPE), and A Management Plan with Recommendations.
The Background section of this thesis addresses historical evolution
of the definitions of combat stress. These definitions are the basis for the
development of the terminology used in this thesis. It is also' necessary
to review a case study of a mijitary situation where the impact of combat
stress can be seen with some clarity. Multitudes of documents exist which
detail the events of combat and the associated stressors. However, the
shooting of the Iranian Airbus by the USS Vincennes, on 3 July 1988, is a
combat scenario witb documented data and reactions to stimuli containing
cons picuous detail. The overall effects of combat stress are easily
discernible in this scenario and provide a model for further evaluation.
Physiological Considerations of Man-Machine Interaction presents the
physiological factors which impact cognition and decision-making with
respect to information display systems. An understanding of these factors
is integral to, understanding the interactive processes, involved. Research
in this field is highlighted.
Summary of Research on Psychological Human Factors Introduces
psychological theory on determinants of varied cognitive mechanisms.
Sinc e there are highly diverse theories on the cognitive processes, only
those theories whose supporting documentation expands and clarifies the
definitions of combat stress, as defined in this thesis, are presented. The
psychological implications of interaction with a complex information display
system in a military organization i. daveloped. Current research
supporting these theories is highlighted.
The Factors Influencing Cognition and Decision-Making reveals
conclusions determined to date in ongoing research. These conclusions are
the basis for resolving the question of the effect of combat stress on the
man-machine interface of complex information display systems. Studies of
man-task mismatch and the impact of complexity and organizational elements
are discussed. An understanding of research that must be accomplished
is developed.
Evaluation of Military Standards and Acquisition Policies Concerning
ADPE cultivates an understanding of what human factors cited in chapters
III and IV are presently considered in current acquisitions of ADPE. This
presentation reveals areas of deficiency whos.: resolution is necessary to
preclude failure of newly acquircd complex information display systems.
In summation, A Management Plan with Recommendations is proposed
which incorporates the pertinent facts of the previous, chapters into a
comprehensive approach to resoiving the effects of combat stress on the
man-machine in'erface' of complex information, display systems.
Recommendations on simulations and software are included.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. DEFINITION OF COMBAT STRESS
Addressing the issues and problems of combat stress are tainted with
the connotetions elicited by the te.'m itself. Historically, the study of the
phenomenon has been underained by preconceptions associated with the
incapacitating effects of combat stress. These effects were linked to the
concepi of mental instability or genetic predisposition to mental weakness.
To define the term "combat stress", it is important to review its historical
preconceptions to ensure an unbiased definition !s constructed.
Combat stress, from an American perspective, was initially addressed
only through diagnosis and treatment of soldiers who became completely
dysfunctional in battle. Prior to World War I (WWI), the United States
military establishment diagnosed soldiers who suffered from an incapability
to function in the war environment as suffering from some type of brain
damage caused by the severe impact of air associated with an explosion.
This diagnosis was termed "shell shocked". Studies conducted around 1916
determined that this phenomenon was a psychological dirorder. Men,
however, were expected to bcs able to conduct combat, protecting their
family, country 'and ideals, regardless of the existing conditions.
Prior to World War II (WWII), the military diagnosed these same
symptoms as "war neurosis" and "traumatic neurosis" and defined its
origin as "due to a predisposing personality defect" (Figley, 1978, p. xv).
Preinduction physicals during WWII, that attempted to predict this
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predisposing personality, resulted in a rejection rate three to four times
greater than that of WWI. Despite these efforts, during WWII, there was
a 300 percent increase in incidents of the disorder. The predispositional
factors remained assumed and the terminology "Psycho" was coined--which
tainted the affected soldiers with negative nuances. The underlying
question became whether the soldier was incapable of fighting due to a
psychological disorder or unwilling to fight due to cowardice. Figley
suggests in his book that the "orm "exhaustion" was coined during WWII
by a medical commander to lessen the negative connotations of the
condition and discourage the use of the term "Psycho".
During the Korean- War, with a heightened concern for the severe
rigors encountered by their personnel, the United States Navy delineated
dysfunctional sailors into categories of these suffering from "physical
exhaustion" versus those suffering from "combat exhaustion". WWII
statistics indicated that admission rates into field hospitals for dysfunction
based on combat experience in the European theater combat divisions were
25 percent, while infantry battalions were 20 percent, and Southwest
Pacific rates were even higher. Based upon these statistics, the Navy
implemented a nine month rotation period-acknowledging an environmental
causal factor thus limiting their personnel to its exposure. The Navy saw
a reduction in occurrences of dysfunction caused by combat 'stress in their
sailors.
In 1952, the military !_D]postic and Statistical Manual I described
dysfunction caused by combat experience as a condition of gross stress
reaction. Continued research advanced understanding of the complicated
phenomenon.
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War has almost always been accompanied by great advances in the
medical sciences. It is obvious that large numbers of sick and
wounded demand from the ingenuity of doctors better methods of
diagnosis and treatment. A host of new discoveries develop
concurrently as necessity demands, and old fetishes, maintained by
inertiA and conservatism, are relinquished. (Grinker, 1963, p. 427)
Interrelationships between combat stress and all facets of the soldier's life
were established. The emotional stress, of combat was delineated into
subcategories.
The emotional stress is a complex network of unusual strains inherent
in the combat situation. The stress is derived from different sources,
which again mutually reinforce each other. Although complex, they
can be reduced to four principal categories: thp all-pervading threat
of personal injury or death, the injury or death of friends with its
powerful effect on the interpersonal relations previously described,
the necessity to engage in continually hostile and destructive activity,
and finally the'effect of all these strains, both physical and emotional,
on individual motivation to remain in combat. (Grinker, 1963, p. 33)
However, in 1968, the military's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual II replaced
this description with the term "Adjustment Reactions of Adult Life" and
defined it as "fear associated with military combat and manifested by
trembling, running and hiding" (Figley, 1978, p. xvii). It is interesting to
note that the period between the initial publication of •he first manual and
that of the setnond manual were not marred with any major American
military wars, except the Korean Conflict. It suggests hat the experiences
recognized during and after previous combat experien es were ignored by
the authors of this military document. The prejudice lived on.
After the Vietnam Conflict, a return to concent ated study of the
effect of combat stress on the soldiers of the combat heater began. As
soldiers returned to civilian life, marriage dissolutions, Inability to meintain
former jobs, homelessness, and violence against society increased
significantly in the post-conflict veterans. This co dition effected the
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study of the "Post Traumatic Stress Disorder" and its underlying causes.
The symptoms of this disorder were often used as causal agents during.
trials of Vietnam Veterans for crimer against society. With compassion for
the victims, society developed strong conflicting philosophies about this
combat oriented dysfundtion. Vietnam Veterans still carry the stigmatism
of those negative philosophies today.
In 1991, conversation with junior officers of the Naval Postgraduate
school revealed a predominant belief that combat stress reactions masked
cowardice in the individual involved. A predisposition to the stress
reaction was not noted however. Similarly, a senior officer with operational
responsibility assigned to Air Force Space Command when queried about
the effects of combat stress on the man-machine interaction of early
warning radar systems responded that it did not exist in Space Command
because they trained in a war-like environment.
Based upon the responses above, it is apparent that despite the
advancements made in the medical communities at least a portion of the
military operational community still holds biases concerning the definition
of combat stress. Although the pervasiveness and intensity is, unknown,
connotations of cowardice or unacceptable weakness are still associated,
with the term. Grosser defines stress as "any force that pushes the
functioning of :mportant subsystems beyond their ability to restore
equilibrium through. ordinary, nonemergency, adjustment processes"
(Grosser, 1964, p. 13). Modifying this definition, for the purpose of this
thesis, combat stress is defined as follows:
Within a military situation, any force (internal, environmental,
organizational) that pushes the functioning of important human subsystems
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beyond their abihty to restore equilibrium through ordinary,
nonemergency, adjustment processes, the consequences of which may
be catastrophic events. Dysfunction due to combat stress shall not
consider events of cowardice.
B. A CASE STUDY
Oui 3 July 1988, the AEGIS equipped, Ticonderoga class, guided missile
cruiser, the U.S.S. Vincennes (CG-49) was assigned to the Persian Gulf and
tasked with providing anti-air warfare coverage for friendly forces. While
countering a sea-based hostile attack, by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC), the ship erroneously i4entified a civilian aircraft,' Iran Air
Flight 655, as a hostile airborne target and shot down the aircraft. All
passengers and crew were killed. A synopsis of the personnel readiness,
equipment readiness, environment, command and control configuration, and
decision-making factors involved (as detailed in the Department of
Defense's Formal Investiration into Circumstances Surroundine the Downinr
of Iran Air Flicht 655 on 3 July 1988) follows.
1. Personnel/Equipment Readiness
Upon deployment to the Persian Gulf, the U.S.S. Vincennes was "in
the highest state of training and readiness: C1 in Personnel, Supply,
Equipment and Training: M1 in AAW [antiaircraft warfare], AMW
[amphibious warfare], ASW [antisubmarine warfare], ASUW [antisurface
warfare],' C3 [Command, Control and Communications], EW [electronic
warfare]l, and training areas." (Formal Investigation, 1988, p. 18) Training
schedules prior to deployment were extensive and continuous for the ship.
After deployment, traininir was continued at Naval Air Station Subic Bay,
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Philippines. An exercise in May 1988 included a scenario of an attacking
aircraft. Equipment preventive maintenance documentation was properly
recorded and had no significant discrepancies. The AEGIS combat system
was working in accordance with requirements.
Within the Combat Information Center (CIC), a key position was
manned by an unqualified person. "The Commanding Officer U.S.S.
VINCENNES certified all officer watchstanders as qualified; however [name
withheld) had not completed PQS [Personnel Qualification System) for AAWC
[antiaircraft warfare commander]" (Formal Investigation, 1988, p.° 21). This
position coordinates activities of the ship's warfare systems. This officer's
actions are not in question here; however, the lack of confidence in this
person brought about strong assertions of other watchstanders' beliefs.
"TIC's [Tactical Information Coordinator's] perception that there was an
inexperienced, weak leader in the AAWC position led to the emergence of
TIC in a leadership role. TIC's reports were accepted by all and could
have influenced the final decision to launch missiles" (Formal Investigation,
1988, p. 45). Therefore, stress originating in the lack of confidence of an
unqualified person, on duty, during a battle environment, was present in
the CIC.
During. the engagement of the IRGC's attacking boats, the U.S.S.
Vincennes lost use of one gun due to a fouled bore. This phenomenon
occurs when the gun does not fire off a round. Dependent upon the heat
of the bore and the cause of the misfire, there exists the possibility of the
projectile exploding in the gun. The consequences of this, on this ship,
could have been damage to the ship and personnel located in areas other
than those immediate to the gun itself. Until completion of detailed
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checklists required to clear a fouled bore, personnel in the CIC would be
under the stress associated with the uncertainty of this event.
L Environment
Three predominant factors bear further scrutiny in the
environment of the U.S.S. Vincennes during the attack on the Iranian
Airbus. These are: an intelligence induced expectation of attack, combat
bias caused by an affirmation of the expectation of attack and excessive
Confusion levels.
The operational posture of the U.S.S. Vincennes was high on the
day of the attack on the Iranian Airbus. Expectations of attack were
prevalent due to intelligence reports highlighting increased air and naval
activity in the Persian Gulf. In April 1988, the U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts
was severely 'amaged by Iranian mines: the United States took retaliatory
action. From 30 June to 2 July 1988, Iraq conducted numerous air attacks
on Iranian oil facilities and shipping. Iran responded with deployment of
air assets and increased shipping attacks. Combat expectations were
heightened when intelligence reports alerted U.S. forces to expect probable
attacks on American assets in the Gulf during the holiday weekend.
Intelligence advisories detailed the movement of hostile Iranian F-14
aircraft into Bandar Abbas. Sensitivity to the deaths aboard the U.S.S.
Stark was renewed. In this unfortunate incident, a U.S. Navy ship, while
participating in an exercise was shot by the Iragis. The loss of American
lives was high.
In an affirmation of the-expectation of attack, during the morning
of the-third of July, Iranian 'Revolutionary Guard Corps gun boats, while
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challenging merch&nt vessels from the Strait of Hormuz's western approach,
fired upon an American helicopter detached from the U.S.S. Vincennes. The
helicopter and tbe U.S.S. Montgomery were, reacting in defense of the
merchant vessels. The U.S.S. Vincennes responded and was prepared to
battle the IRGC gun boats.
On the U.S.S. Vincennes, confusion in the CIC became high during
the confrontation with the attacking gun boats. Due to a fouled bore in one
of its guns, the U.S.S. Vincennes maneuvered radically at high speed to
maintain gunsighting of the attackers. This maneuver caused falling books,
publications and loose equipment from the consoles and desks of the CIC.
This environment was not one simulated in combat training scenarios
conducted by the Vincennes. The effect on the crew would raise stress
levels--possibly degrading their ability to analyze objectively combat
information.
3. Command and Control
Although the Commanding Officer had revised the basic Battle
Doctrine, this revision was implemented prior to arrival in the Persian Gulf
and was trained while' transitting Subic, Bay.
Stress associated with difficulty in communicating intraship was
vident. Communications internal to the ship were conducted on nets- 15
Degradation of the nets, provoked by the use of the net by an
excessive number of personnel, caused difficulty in :"tting information
from one station to another. Further, "Internal communications procedures,
i.e. specific call ups in accordance with standard procedures, were known
by operators but not always used" (Formal Investigation, 1989, p. 22). 'This
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deviation from procedures could be a significait stressor as ambiguity
became prevalent Letween stations.
4. Decision-Making
The time period in which the U.S.S. Vincennes Commanding Officer
had to decide whether or not to shoot the unidentifiable aircraft was
significantly short.
Time compression played a significant role in the incident. From the
time the CO first became aware of a possible threat, until he made his
decision to engage, the elapsed time was approximately three minutes,
40 seconds. Additionally, the Commanding Officer's attention which
was devoted to the ongoing surface engpisement against IRGC forces
(the "wolf closest to the sled"), left very little time for him to
personally verify information provided to him by his CIC team in
which he had great confidence. The fog of war and those human
elements which affect each individual differently-not the least of
which was the thought of the Stark incident-are factors that must
be considered. (Formal Investigation, 1988, p. 43)
In summation, on the day of the attack of the Iranian Airbus, the
personnel of the U.S.S. Vincennes were subjected to not only the stressors
of battle, but were also subjected to the stressors detailed above. The
extent of these stressors on the final outcome of the incident will never
be known. However, elimination of the causes of these stressors should be
considered for future use to maximize the capabilities and. utilization of the
personnel in combat.
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III. PHYSIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF MAN-MACHINE INTERACTION
Human engiiueering, also known as human factors, human factors
engineering, engineering psychology, or ergonomics, is based upon the
assumption that the design of man-made devices, systems, and
environments can enhance or degrade their uie by people. This
scientific applied discipline emphasizes the hiritan as one component
of the system or environment. Human engineering is a young
developing dircipline' cutting across such areas as engineering,
physiology, medicine, anthropology, and psychology. (Hendricks, 1983,
p. 1-1)
Human factors' relationships, associated with the human performance
model, are depicted by Van Cott below. These processes may be delineated




Figure 1. The Human Information 'rocesstng System (Van Cott, 1972, p. 18)
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The sensory subsystem consists of the reception of stimuli (received
through sight, sound, smell, touch and taste) from the equipment and the
environment to the human. This newly encoded energy is stored in
memory (a component of the storage subsystem) then manipulated by some
information process (a function of the information processing subsystem).
The response subsystem executes the processed information into actions.
This system deals with such items as the body dimensions, muscle strength
and ranges of motion associated with the operation of equipment. For the
purpose of this thesis, the storage subsystem and the information
processing functions will be dealt with in Chapter IV, Summary of Research
on Psychological Human Factors.
A. THE SENSORY SUBSYSTEM
In the design of a man-machine system,- the human senses may be
considered candidates for directly detecting and measuring conditions
about performance or about events in its environment .... For the
designer to take advantage of a human sensor's sensitivity, resolving
capability, or information transmission capacity, he must do so
indirectly by changing or selecting conditions external to it: the
energy or information source, its location, intensity and coding; the
rate and manner of information presentation; etc. (Van Cott, 1972, p.
19)
The physiological components of the sensory subsystem are an
established entity in man-machine interaction. Apart from glasses and'
hearing aids, there is very little that can be done to manipulate the user's
ability to perceive a stimuli. Aids,'such as electromechanical, or optical
sensors, may, be used by operators to perceive stimuli outside the range
of the user's abilities. Tactile and motion cues, though not experienced at
the conscious level, may disorient the user, for example the lack of a click
after depressing a typing key forces the typist to watch the screen for
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confirmation. Th-erefcŽ,e, generally, the stimuli must be manipulated to
satisfy the requirements of the user.
Visual cues are the strongest and most immediate of those applied to
human senses. Strong cues tend to subordinate weaker ones, and
visual cues may subordinate sound cues or sensations of one's motion.
However, as discovered in research using aircraft and flight
simulators, inconsistency of several strong cue.; can produce
disorientation, vertigo,, or even nausea. A confusing set of strong
visual cues may have the same effect. (Beam, 1989, p. 231)
The operational stimuli, which are a component of the
hard ware/software system, may be induced electromagnetically,
mechanically, thermally or chemically. The sensing of this stimuli is
typically nonliniear. Therefore, a doubling "of sound energy does not
double loudness. In actuality, a tenfold increase in sound energy is
necessary to elicit a perception of a doubling of sound. .(Van Cott, 1972,
p. 20) This phenomenon further complicates the evaluation of sensors La
man-machine interaction.
The populace limits of the sensing subsystem include both sensing
thresholds and sensing limits. The threshold is "that point on an intensity
scale below which we do n~ot detect a stimuli and above which we do"
(Bailey, 1982, p. 53). Above this sensing threshold, a.diverse range of'
sensing limits exist. A reflection on the number of people who wear
glasses and the magnitude of the differences in their* pres'criptions is a
good example of this concept. Color blindness, which is found in eight
percent of the male population and one percent of the female population,
is another limitation which must be evaluated in this category.
Another facet of the sensing subsystem is the identdication of a
stimuli or its magnitudes based upon an absolute rather than a relative
basis. This happens -when it is impractical or undesirable to use a
reference stimuli. Example3 of this would be when a pilot estimates his
altitude or when an infantryman estimates the speed of a tank. Similarly,
it, occurs when a radar- console operator mentally extrapolates a position
(due to activities which dominate his logic processes) based upon a
previous radar indication. The implications of a poor absolute judgement
can be massive, with an incorrect decision resulting in loss of life and/or
equipment.
The design implications of the sensing parameters are numerous. The
parameters vary fs',m individual to individual and it is necessary to
conduct experiments with users who are representative of the education,
training and physical parameters of the oper&tor- population.. Furthermore,
the designer must consider the variations caused by adverce work
conditions. Military systems are developed for use during war. The
environment of the battlefield is plagued with boredom, stress, confusion
and the fear of death. These sensory inputs cause variation in the user
abilities which must be accounted for in the 3uccessful design of the
system. Numerous medical encyclopedias have been written establishing the
limits of human sensing. The sensing thresholds of the Sensory Subsystem
have been well documented in the Joint Army-Navy-Air Force Steering
Committee sponsored Human, Engineering Guide to Eauidment Desifn. The
energies that stimulate human sensors have been thoroughly studied by
G.H. Mowbray and J.W. Gebhard and documented in their Man's Senses as
Information Channels, a report published by Johns Hopkins University.
These studies are the basis of a comprehensive adaptation by Harold P.
Van Cott of the American Institutes for Remearch and Melvin J. Warrick of
the Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory, Wright Patterson Air Force
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Base. Their adaptation, included in the Guide, is documented in Man as a
System Compenent. Visual, speech, auditory and other sensory forms are
included as well in the Guide. The Guide remains a comprehensive survey
ot the sensory subsystem requirements for man-machine interaction.
B. RESPONSE SUBSYSTEM
The response subsystem consists of the human physiological capability
to react to a stimuli. This process takes into consideration the voluntary
and involuntary reflexes controlled by the brain, anthropomorphic traits
of the user, the feedback mechanism required for response correction, and
the variability within individuals. These individual response capabilities
vary from day to day, and fro-. one time of day to another. They are
seriously impacted by fatigue, tension, tremor and pain. Boredom, which
is very difficult to measure, also incredses variability and degrades
performance.
The rate with which information can be transmitted by a response
system is assumed to be !rom less than three bits per second to a maximum
of about nine bits per second. For verbal responses a maximum rate of
eight bits per second has been indicated, and keypressing has a maximum
rate of about two and eight-tenths bits per second (Van Cott, 1972, p. 34).
The variability within the human race is a consideration in response
capabilities. Targeting for a capabilities exhibited by the majority of the
user population is recommended for system design. AlD size considerations
and par.meters must be recognized as well.
As with the Sensory Subsystem, the Response Subsystem 'has
numerous medical journals dedicated to the subject. Similarly, the Human
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Enzineering Guide to Ecuipment Design thoroughly addresses the subject.
A survey of the system design implications of the Response Subsystem is
addressed i: Bailey's Human Pcrforsance Engineering: A Guide for System
Desirners.
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IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF MAN-MACHINE INTERACTION
The brain's cognitive processing is the least understood mechanism of
the human factors. A survey '3f this facet introduces the amount of
information processed, transmission delays and reaction times, upper limits
of information transmission rate, information compression, pattern
recognition, learning, memory storage and decision-making. The basic
concepts of each is detailed below.
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Figure 2. The Model Human Processor (Card, 1983, p. 26)
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Scientific experimentation can approximate the amount of information
processed during a specific task through task trials and statistical
analysis. The mind works as a Perceptual Processor, Visual Memory Store,
Auditory Memory Store, Working Memory Store, Long-Term Store, Cognitive
Processor and Motor Processor in decision-making. As the complexity of
the task increases, the time required to make a decision increases as well.
This function is not a linear one since humans have the capability of
grouping tasks together and then deciding which groups must have
further attention. This hierarchical arrangement saves time. (Card, 1983,
pp. 65-78) The previous figure presents the interactions of the cognitive
processes in decision-making.
Addressing a rational decision-making process, the approximation of the
time required to make the decision is computed as follows: "To a first
order approximation, the response time of people is proportional to the
information-theoretic entropy of the decision."(Card, 1983, p. 72) This
information-theoretic entropy incorporates the innate difficulty of making
the decision given the uncertainty of the facts. The information processed
is correlated to "bits-the logarithm to the base two of equally likely
alternatives" (Van Cott, 1972 p. 26). This correlation takes into
consideration the probability of the occurrence of the response, the
probability of the occurrence of the stimuli, and the conditional
probabilities of the 'responses given the stimuli. Statistical determination
of the amount of information processed can be made using this information.
(Card, 1983, p. 74) By knowing the amount of information processed and
applying the information-theory entropy factor, the time to reach the
decision can be approximated.
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The simple reaction time required to process a stimuli and respond
with one motor movement requires the use of the Perceptual Processor, the
Visual Image Store, the Working Memory, the Cognitive Processor and the
Motor Processor. Using values determined in research, the average simple
reaction time was found to be 100-400 milliseconds. Simple matching
requires 130-640 milliszeconds with name matches and class matches
requiring approximately 380 milliseconds and 450 milliseconds respectively.
(Card, 1983, p. 66)
The reaction times cited are the shortest possible with no delays.
Some factors that impact transmission delay and influence decision time are:
"the sense used, the characteristics of the input signal, signal rate,
whether or not anticipatory information is provided, the response
requirements of the task, and the individual differences in age, sex,
training, experience and instructions." (Van Cott, 1972, p. 29)
B. UPPER LIMITS OF INFORMATION TRANSMISSION RATES
The upper limits of the information-transmission rate for the human
can not' be specifically defijied since it varies from task to task.
Experimentation on keying times fo" a typewriter, based on Fitt's Law, was
aound to be influenced by the characteristics of the text, layout of the
keyboard, training and practice. (Card, 1983, pp. 51-66)
C. INFORMATION COMPRESSION
The human mind may select information from a -variety of inputs,
retrieve information from storage, selectively use data and "compress" this
sum into an idea. The mind may use all data or may respond to certain
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distinct stimuli. The process accentuates the importance of the perception
of stimuli. Information compression .is the user's combination of
information from a variety of sources. The user may add information from
memory and respond selectively to input stimuli. While not proven
conclusively, there appears to be a linear relationship between the amount
of information compression and the time allocated to accomplish the task.
(Beam, 1989, p. 29)
D. PATTERN RECOGNITION
Pattern recognition is one of the best documented aspect of cognitive
processing factors. Pattern recognition deteriorates when: the number
of stimuli increases, the patterns become more redundant, the patterns are
symmetric and novel patterns are presented. (Van Cott, 1972, p. 30)
E. LEARNING
Learning is often delineated from training and is defined by Bailey as
"the conditions under which a behavior is acquired." Training, similarly,
is defined as "the effective and efficient way to obtain knowledge, skills
or attitudes at identified levels and under particular conditions" (Bailey,
1982,,p. 465).' However, learning is beat considered an adaptive process by
which the human survives in his environsont (Van Cott, 1972, p. 30). In
this survival process, both learning and training occurs. To stringently
differentiate between the two leaves each at a loss. Each requires a
portion of a cognitive skill termed "search control knowledge". With
experience and feedback, a search control knowledge is developed which
helps a human pr oceed through a problem and its alternatives in an
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expeditious manner. With enough of this search control knowledge the
person can proceed directly to the appropriate solution of a situation.
(Card, 1982, pp. 365-373) It is obvious that learning takes place for the
human to resolve the problem. Whether or not the problem'is the only
focus of attention does not influence the survival mechanism.
F. MEMORY STORAGE
Memory may be considered in its component parts of Auditory
Infcrmation Store, Visual Image Store, 'Working Memory and Long-Term
Memory. The auditory and visual subcomponents (the perceptual memories)
encode physically stimuli received from the sensors. The characteristics
*of the stimuli are noted, such as 'loudness, brightness, length. The
Working Memory rapidly encodes the physical code of the perceptual
memories into representation. If the perceptual code fades before the
Working Memory can develop a representation for it, the stimuli is lost to
the human as a piece of data for processing. It is possible for the
Cognitive Processor to dictate to the Working Memory which trait of the
perceived stimuli is to be encoded--that information is noted while other
'information if ignored.
Long-term Memory stores information in related-chunks. Information
is retrieved from the Working Memory and associated with like information.
A retrieval cue is linked to all 'information stored in Long-Term Memory.
Long-Term Memory chunks never deteriorate; however, their retrieval into
the Working Memory is hampered by a functional loss of the retrieval cues.
Long term memory has implications for, training and design. ,It involves
the integration and recall of information' acquired over a. long period of
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time from sources such as experience or operational plans. The accuracy
of the information after lengthy periods of time is under study. (Card,,
1983, pp. 35-41)
Difficulties are noted with each of the types of memory. The
perceptual memories may not encode all the aspects of the stimuli due to
sensory limitations, shortness of time, bias towards one aspect of the
stimuli or direction of the Cognitive Processor. A common problem is the
inability to recall a specific item if their is a lke item already in the
memory.
The Working Memory is susceptible to interference from acoutiscal
facets of the data, i.e., if words souad alike they may be confused.
Similarly, the Long-Term Memory may be confused with semantics. Items
that have similar meanings may be confused in the Long-Term Memory. As
the Long-Term Memory, associates larger amounts of information, this
semantic confusion increases. (Card, 1983, pp. 79-82)
G. DECISION-MAKING
Decision-making is often delineated from problem solving in research.
Problem solving is defined by Bailey as the "discovery of a correct
solution in a situation that is new to an individual"; while, decision-
making is defined as "weighing of known alternative responses in terms of
their desirability and then selecting one of the alternatives". In this
context decision-making starts from uncertainty at the beginning and ends
in certainty. Due to the uncertainty of the world, decision-making can
become very complex and require instruction, performance aids, or training.
There is great variability in a population's ability to make decision&. Risk,
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bias.'and fear are all factors which can influence the process of decision-
making. (Bailey, 1982, pp. 141-143)
Decision- making, in its simple form, is known to consist of the facets
described above: the perception of the stimuli, the encoding of the data
in the perceptual memories, the representation of portions of this data into
the Working Memory, the association of the data with like information in
the Long-Term Memory, the search of Long-Term Memory for required data
and feedback. (Card, 1982, pp.65-76) The method by which the actual
choice of the final alternative in the decision process and the influences
upon it are still under research. Much documentation has been
accomplished in development of aids to this process; however,, the.
uniqueness of man continues to evade conclusive, determination of the final
decision mechanism.
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V. FACTORS INFLUENCING COGNITION AND DECISION-MAKING
An understanding of neurotic reactions to combat requires knowledge
not only of the observable clinical symptoms and behavior which
appear when the ego has begun to weaken, but also of the
psychological mechanisms underlying successful 'adaptations to the
combat situation. Owing to the intangible and complex nature of
psychological mechanisms, the psychodynamic processes are difficult
to isolate, to measure and to describe. (Grinker, 1963, p. 118)
A. MAN-TASK MISMATCH
The combat environment produces distress signals affecting all parts
of the mind and body. It is an evolutionary protective mechanism that has
enabled the human species to survive successfully since the dawn of man.
In battle, stress wears away enthusiasm and eagerness and over prolonged
periods produces a weariness to battle. Anxiety, which originally was
specifically oriented, spreads over the entire environment and is
heightened by the most trivial sounds. Tension leads to restlessness;
sleep dwindles and may be accompanied by nightmares. Appetite is
reduced and physical ailments such as gaatroint,',stinal distress are common.
Irritability increases. (Grinker, 1963, p. 54) In this environment, errors
occur more frequently and the study of their cognitive basis may be
confronted in a variety of ways. With an understanding of cognitively
based error, the effect of stress in this process can be studied. The
current research by Jens Rasmussen and James Reason addresses these
errors from a perspective that a man-task mismatch is the foundation for
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errors in a stressed environment. The following is a review of their
theories.
1. Human Error and Technical Systems
The interaction of man and machine in any environment is
influenced by numerous factors. As defined by Jens Rasmussen, this
interaction is depicted in the figure below.
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Fligure 3. Interaction of man-machine system .(Rasmussen, 1987, p. 28)
Errors that occur which cause an unacceptable state in the man-
Smachtine environment matj be studied from a causal position. Human
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variation should not be considered the cause of errors; rather, the most
constructive approach to evaluation is study of the factors which
precipitated the human error. "The resulting relevant "internal
malfunctions' are then correlated with each of the steps in an assumed
work procedure by careful consideration of potential interference in the
different elements of the decision sequence and the combined effects of
possible inappropriate acts are assessed for different alternative system
configurations." (Rasmussen, 1987, p. 28)
2. Principles for Systematic Classification of Errors
Errors effected in a man-machine environment require further
classification for study and numerous approaches have been taken to
accomplish this. In 1964, research suggested adjustment to stress and its
associated errors could be approached from the stages of the catastrophic
event (Miller, 1964, p. 11). Current research addresses errors from the
causal approach. As detailed by Reason, errors can be classified in a
matrix consisting of eight primary error groupings (PEGs), with five basic
error tendencies (BETs), applicable against eight information processing
domains (IPDs). All errors are then further identified by situational
factors. The following figure details the interrelationships of this
classification system.
a. Basc Error Tendencis
The five BETs are ecological constraints, change-enhancing
biases, resource limitations, schema properties, and strategies and
heuristics. A discussion of these follows.
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Figure 4. Matrix for Classifying Primary Error Groupings (Reason, 1987,
p.lo)
Ecological constraints are those limitations which have
developed in man through an evolution process based upon human
movement above ground, at three to four miles per hour, under normal
gravity (ReAson, 1988, p. 6). Today, environments and systems do not
always function under these domains; aircraft and ships may operate
under other than normal gravitational pull. Numerous weapons systems
travel at speeds greater than four miles per hour. Therefore, errors
occurring in these environments may be based in a mismatch of what the
human system has evolved to expect and what the physical reality is.
Change-enhancing biases occur due to the imperfect human
psychological scaling mechanisms. These mechanisms are intended to only
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sense change and tend to attenuate quantities found in steady states and
exaggerate measurements for changing quantities. (Reason, 1987, p. 7)
Resource limitations are a major cause of. errors. Human
capabilities are limited by the amount of information which can be sensed,
memory storage limitations, the amount of information processing the mind
can accomplish, and the amount and speed with which the human can
respond. (Reason, 1987, P. 7)
The constancy of the environment and our routine dealings
with this environment make up the subcategory of schema properties.
While this familiarity ei.hances the human capability to quickly solve
routine problems, a .ailureoccurs when the mind elects a familiar response
in an unfamiliar environment. This is caused by fitting data to the wrong
environment, use of best guesses to fill missing information, and relying
heavily on known schema. (Reason, 1987, p. 8)
The use of "rules of thumb" incorporate the error of
heuristics., These actions and inputs may be very unsuited for the
environment at hand, leading to error. Further, the strategic approach to
solving a problem may consist of actions not appropriate to the
environment. Errors of this kind are similar to losing a chess game.
b. Informatiom Processing Domains
The eight IPDs ,which make up the primary error groupings.
deal with the human information proceszing stages and operations. These
consist of sensory registration, input selection, temporary memory, long-
term memory, recognition processes, judgmental processes, inferential,
processes and action control Reason elected to classify the domains in
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this manner due to the pattern in which error data "clustered in
psychological literature" (Reason, 1987, p. 8). It should be noted that none
of these cognitive functions are structurally distinct and overlap occurs
:among each. However, delineation is possible with consideration of the
primary process.
C. Primary Error Groupings
With the combination of the BETs and the IPDs, formation of
the PEGs is possible. Eight PEGs are developed in this manner and are
identified as false sensations, attentionas failures, memory lapses, inaccurate
recall, misperceptions, errors of judgment, inferential errors and
unintended actions. In these categories, if the BETs are known to provide
the greater influence, a primary node is depicted. Within the same
categories, if the certainty of interaction is suspect or the influence of the
BET is actuated in an earlier process, then the formation of a secondary
node is present.
False sensations are the direct or indirect cause of many
human errors. The discrepancy occurs when the human subjective
experience of the environment conflicts with the reality in which the human
functions. This may arise due to sensory distortion or misrepresentation
of fact. Errors caused by the cognitive processes misinterpreting the
stimuli received is not covered in this category. Situations in which false
sensations are experienced are : "during and immediately after exposure
to steady-state inputs in any modality; in cotiditions of simultaneous and
successive contrast; when viewing two-ýdmensional representations of
three-dimensional objects; 'in atypical force environments involving'periods
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of constant velocity rotation, or variations in the strength or direction of
the gravito-inertial vector; during and immediately following exposure to
visual or inertial rearrangement; when viewing large-scale moving visual
scenes; in high-speed flight; under water" (Reason, 1987, p. 10).
Attentional failures address a universal control process which
is limited in its effect on a variety of cognitive domains. These failures
are caused by coping with distractions, processing simultaneously numerous
inputs, focusing on one or two key messages, dividing attention between
two tasks, time limiting the comp~etion of appropriate cognitive combinations
of information, monotonous monitoring, custodial and verification tasks.
(Reason, 1987, p. 11)
Memory lapses address the volatile memory. It consists of
forgetting listed items, forgetting intentions, and losing track of previous
actions. It is interesting to note that the majority of experimental
literature deals with the forgetting of listed items. (Reason, 1987, p.11)
The absent-minded misuse of words, signals and actions make
up the category of unintended words and actions. This includes slips of
tongue, in sign language the slip of hand, slips of action and the Freudian
slip. (Reason, 1987, p. 11)
Recognition failure encompasses the incorrect interpretation
of sensory inputs. This can be caused by incomplete sensory inputs and
a strong expectation for another stimuli.' Subdivisions consist of
experimental manipulation, mishearing speech, misreading text, misreading
signals and instruments, misperceptions in routine actions and
misperceptions in people. (Reason, 1987, p. 12)
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Recall and the recollection Gf subcategories are addressed in
inaccurate and blocked recall. The objects of the process dete-mine the
cu'egories: misremembering places, sentences, stories, faces, events and
finally blocked recall. Reason clarifies that blocked recall is properly
considered- with long-term memory failures based upon evidence of
schematic biases. (Reason, 1987,, p. 12)
Errors of judgement are categorized by the task involved.
These divisions are: psychophysical misjudgments, temporal misjudgments,
misconceptions of chance, misconceptions of covariation, misjudgments of
risk, misdiagnoses, fallacies in probability judgements and erroneous social
assessments.
When evaluating stress and its effects on man-machine
interface, the errors produced in high stress situations should be
categorized using the principles of Rasmussen and Reason. In this
framework, the cognitive process being inhibited may be identified and a
resolution to the cause cua be addressed. Through this structured
approach, assist in' overccming the "intangible and complex nature of
psychological mechanisms" which confounded Grinker in 1963 (Grinker, 1963,
p. 118).
B. ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS AND COMPLEXITY
Research indicates that organizational structure with. its component
discipline, expectations and linkage influence cognition and deeision-making.
Also, both the complexity of any task and the complexity of the
environment, with its component parts, affect the performance of a system
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u-ar. Consideration of these factors are necessary for a comprehensive
approach to solving the impact of stress of man-machine interface.
1. High Reliability Organizations
High Reliability Organizations (lIROs) are a subject of extensive
research by Karlene H. Roberts, Haas School of Business Administration.
University of California. As defined in her article, Some Characteristics ot
One Type of Aiiq h Reliability, Organization. a HR.O is a complex, hazardous,
organization whose failure could lead to catastrophic result; but, whose
safety record over thousands of events remains high (Roberts, 1990, p.
160). This specific article deals with the organizational safety on a flight
deck of a nuclear powered aircraft carrier. Since ADPE is utilized in war
environments, often its failure can contribute to a catastrophic result;
therefore, details of the organizational elements enumerated in this- article
are particularly useful in studying the interaction of the organization and
the ADPE user in a combat situation.
The negative affects of complexity on the flight'deck were found
to be countered by a number of factors. Training in a wide variety of
scenarios prepared the crew members for normally 'unexpected
complications.- Activities, which if intermingled would cause a catastrophic
result, were kept separated. Geographic separation on the flight deck, the.
use of the buddy system for monitoring, the color-coding of uniforms were
all separation practices. Fueling aircraft and munitions loading were cited
as examples. " Numerous indirect information sources" which culminated in
command and control structures supported the separation practices.
(Roberts, 1990, p. 165)
3.
Tight coupling (system connections which are time dependent,
invariant in sequence, unidirectional, containing little flexibility) often leads
to catastrophic results in an emergency situation. On the aircraft carrier,
the tight noupling required to land the aircraft was overcome by layers
and layers of actions used to achieve this goaL This diversity indicated
that the landing was in fact a loosely coupled activity capable of
withstanding emergencies. (Roberts, 1990, p. 166)
Tight coupling caused by the hierarchical structure of the military
was overcome through the barter system evoked by the senior enlisted
personnel. As a buffer to an absolute direentive, these personnel effected
a looser coupling through negotiation with the junior officers. These
actions created both mission and motivational changes, i.e., the time
constraints of the supply system's documentation were circumvented
through negotiations on paperwork deadlines. (Roberts, 1990, p. 167)
As a counteracting agent to both complexity and tight coupling,
redundancy was prevalent. This existed in not only back-up computer
systems, but, also, in duplication of actions on the flight line. An example
used was that of the number of personnel, who within the confines of their
normal duties, check to ensure the arriving aircraft's landing gear is
down.
In a study of the effects of combat stress, on the man-machine
interface of complex information display systems, the facets which produce
an HRO should be considered. For, if these factors are deficient in the
combat environment, their contribution to stress and malfunction should be
evaluated.
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J2. On Dealinj with Complexity
Dietric Dorner, of the University of Bamberg, addressed complexity
and the cognitive processes in his research titled "On the Difficulties
People Have in Dealing with Complexity" (Dorner, 1987, pp. 97-109).
Simulation modeling was used to identify difficulties encountered in a
critical situation and the limitations of a simulation should be considered
in the results.
Dorner found his subjects to suffer from: insufficient
consideration of processes in time, difficulties in dealing with exponential
developments, thinking in causal series instead of causal nets, thematic
vagabonding, encystment, decreasing willingness to, make decisions,
tendency to delegate and exculpation, tendencies. These difficulties are
now clarified.
a. Insufficient Consideration of Processes in Time
Trend analysis was not conducted by the personnel involved
in complex task decision-making during Dorner's research. These subjects
failed to determine the past tendencies of processes included in the
decision and opted to use the existing state as a determinant. This failure
lead to incorrect assumptions and decisions. (Dorner, 1987, p. 90)
b. Difficulties in Dealing with fxponential Developments
During the simulation, subjects appeared to have no ability
to determine exponential growth. Although cases of exponential growth
surrounded the subjects, they were unable to project growth exponentially
and were surprised at the true outcome of an exponentially developing
phenomenon. Situations of fishing in the north sea, oil consumption, and
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cases of diphtheria were examples of the factors evaluated. (Dorner, 1987,
p. 99)
e. Thinking in Causal Series
Complexity entails actions in a net of events versus in a
series. Subjects of the simulation focussed on what they perceived to be
the main cause of an event versus the causal net of events. In the
foreign policy portion of the simulation this phenomenon was the most
significant. The result of thinking in a causal series was deficiencies in
the decision due to consideration of an inadequate number of factors.
(Dorner, 1987, p. .100)
d. Thematic Vagabonding
Individuals who were uncomfortable with topics under
discussion were found to quickly and often change the focus to other
topics. This jumping from one topic to the next brought superficial
coverage of the topic and inadequate consideration in the decision-making
process. (Dorner, 1987, p. 101)
e. Encystment
This phenomenon was the opposite of the thematic
vagabonding. Subjects engrossed themselves in topics with which they felt
comfortable. They examined all details minutely and would not proceed on
to other factors requiring consideration. Due to this phenomenon, again,
all factors required in the complex decision-making were not addressed.
(Dorner, 1987, p. 102)
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f. Decreasing Wifllingness to Make Decisions
Analysis of the decisions made during the simulation
determined that subjects became reluctant to make decisions. In these
cases, the decision was postponed or not made at all. The complexity of
the situation appeared to overwhelm the subject. (Dorner, 1987, p. 102)
g. Tendency to Delegate
Closely related to postponing decision-making was the
tendency to delegate the responsibility for decision-making. The
complexity involved in the decision was addressed with exasperation and
an ultimate delegation of responsibility. This delegation often occurred
after a failure on the part of the participant. (Dorner, 1987, p. 102)
h. Exculpation Tendencies
Exculpation tendencies is the refusal to accept responsibility
for failures and the tendency to find external causes for the personal
failures of the individual. Blame was often placed against other's laziness,
management's inability or the programming of the simulation. This
phenomenon was found to inhibit the decision-making capabilities of the
subjects in the simulation. (Dorner, 1987, p. 103)
L- Behavior E•perienced Prior to Decision-Making'
Prior to making the complex decision required by -the
simulation, the subjects were found to exhibit behavior not normally
tolerated In their' complex decision-making environments. The increase in
the tolerance of risk was seen after failures and prior to continued
decision-making. Mastering the situation using any method became key to
the subjects. Tolerance of violation of rules and regulations, also, was
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exhibited by the participants. This further reinforced the idea of "success
at any cost". Subjects also had an increased tendency to try and escape.
The risk of failure was perceived to be too great for them.
Despite the fact that Dcrner's research was limited by
the parameters of a simulation, his observations should be seriously
considered as resultant behavior of system users making decisions, while
under stress. These factors must be incorporated and analyzed in further
study of stress, cognition and decision-making.
3. Task Classification
In the development of any simulation or system, a comprehensive
development of the underlying tasks with their interfaces to all
subenvironments is essential. Research supporting the standardization of
this process, based upon a project of the Advanced Research Agency of
the Department of Defense, was compiled by Edwin A. Fleishmann. The
subsequent book, Taxonomies of Human Performance (Fleishmann, 1984, pp.
1-514), is a detailed report on the methodology which b*st accomplishes
development of underlying task from these *approaches: behavior
description, behavior requirements, abilities and task characteristics, task
strategies, ability requi ements and task characteristics. Since this study
addresses well' the task definition problem, its use in simulation
development is encouraged.
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VI. EVALUATION OF MILITARY STANDARDS AND ACQUISITION POLICIES
CONCERNING AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT
A. HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERATIONS IN SYSTEM ENGINEERING
ADPE systems that are procured by the Department of Defense have
all gone through some type of design process in their development. The
purpose of this process is to insure the optimization of system performance
through maximization of user capabilities. This performance is defined as
"the result of a pattern of actions carried out to satisfy an objective
according to some standard" (Bailey, 1972, p. 4). The two most common
standards are quality and quantity; however, for use in military design
and acquisition, a set of military standards are published to achieve this
goal. The human factors considered 'n the design process varies with the
particular design discipline used. The systems engineering approach has
advanced to become the predominant design method for systems acquired
by the DOD. This approach is defined as follows:
Systems engineering is the application of scientific -and engineering
efforts to:
a. Transform an operational need into a description of system
performance parameters and a system configuration through use of an
iterative process of definition, synthesis, analysis, design, test and
evaluation;
b. Integrate related technical parameters and assure compatibility of
all physical, functional, and program interfaces in a manner which
optimize the total system definition and design;
c. Integrate reliability, maintainability, safety, survivability, human
and other such factors into the total engineering effort to meet cost,
schedule, and technical performance objectives. (bSAF MIL-STD-499A,
1974, p. 23).
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It is interesting to note that the systems engineering approach is
divided into phases which correlate with the acquisition phases as defined
by the Defense Acquisition Regulation. The seven phases of systems
engineering (program planning, project planning, system development,
production, distribution, operations and- retirement) are iteratively
addressed using seven steps (problem definition, value definition, value
system design, system synthesis, system analysis, optimization, decision-
making and planning for action). The result of this detailed process is a
comprehensive study of all facets of the system of interest.
The systems engineering method recognizes each system as an
integrated whole even though composed of diverse, specialized
structures and subfunctions. It further recognizes that any system
has a number of objectives and that the balance between them may
.differ widely from system to system. The methods seek to optimize
the overall system functions according to the weighted objectives and
to achieve maximum compatibility of its parts. (Morton, 1959, p. 87)
Designers seeking to measure human performance often mistakenily
assess system performance. However, human performance is only one of
many system design consideraticns. It is imperative to separate the
evaluation of human performance with the system (man-machine interface)
from the system performance without the human factors. ,Despite the
momentous advancements made in techn Iology, the human remains the most
complex element within the system and this facet must undergo rigorous
examination. The human element is, in fact, the ~most likely cause for an
accident or system failure (Bailey, 1982, p. 14). Designers usually have,
little control over the actual people selected as users for their systems.
Managers, with pride in, their units, usually select their most capable
people to operate new systems in the test and evaluation phase of
acquisition. Unfortunately, these operators are often not representative
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of the population of users as a whole. Recause systems are designed for
groups of users, it is necessary to deal with the strengths and weaknesses
expected in the user population. Therefore, standards should be based
upon the capabilities and talents of the group--set within a framework of
limits most representative of the population.
The systems engineer uses a human performance model to analyze the
man-machine interface with complex information systems. This model
consists of the general stste or condition of the human, the activity (to
include any required tools or equipment), and the context in which an
activity is performed. Using the iterative system engineering process,
each of these facets are evaluated for optimization. Numerous publications
are used to document the findings and recommendations of these phases.
A modification of Bailey's representation of this process (Bailey, 1982, p. 25)
in the following figure details this documentation as welL The basic
general, applied general and specific research categories denoted by Bailey
are redistributed to the physiological, psychological and environmental
categories of research in the following figure.
B. ANALYSIS OF MILITARY STANDARDS AND POLICIES
Military Standards are written to provide guidance to the system
engineer and acquisition team for defining system' requirements and
specifications. The use of military standards by acquisition teams is not
mandatory. If cited in an acquisition document, they may be defined as
directive- (requiring contractor compliance to the- letter) or guidance
(requiring contractor compliance with the intent of the document).
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Figure 5. Human Performance Engineering
The Military Standard 1472D (Mil-Std 1472D), Human Encineering
Desirn Criteria for Military Systems. Equipment and Facilities specifically
establishes general human engineering criteria for system design and
development. It is approved for use by all the military departments,
regardless of the publishing agency. Its goal is to achieve required
performance levels by users of the system,, with a minimum of skill,
training time and personnel requirements. It attempts to foster
standardization among systems while achieving sun-machine reliability. It
is interesting to note that a nongovernmental publication, Human
Enclineerinar Guide to Equipment Desirn. was sponsored by a governmental
steering committee and is referred to frequently in this military standard.
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The pertinent information contained within the guide is not incorporated
in the military standard.' This fact acknowledges the lack of governmental
documentation on specific human factors considerations. In further
supporting this supposition, Mil-Std-1472D details that "...any discrepancy
between the force 'criteria of this standard and the physical qualification
requirements shall be resolved in favor of the latter." (Mil-Std 1472D, 1989,
p. 2) The basic human engineering design criteria is defined in military
standards as follows:
The summation of available knowledge which defines the nature and
limits of human capabilities as they relate to the checkout, operation,
maintenance or control of systems or equipment, and which may be
applied during engineering design to achieve optimum compatibility
between equipment and human performance. (Mil-Std 1472D, 1989, p.
12)
This definition is exactly as required by the system engineering design
procedures. Further, the objective of the regulation, which is:
Military systems, equipment and facilities shall provide work
environments which foster effective safety and health, and which
minimize factors which degrade human performance or increase error.
Design , shall be such that operator workload, accuracy, time
constraints, mental processing and communications requirements do not
exceed operator capabilities. Design shall also minimize personnel and
training requirements within the limits of time, cost and performance
-trade-offs. (Mil-Std 1472D, 1989, p. 17)
supports the intent of system engineering. Military Specification (Mil-H-
46855B), Human En-i'neerinr Requirements for Military Systems. Eauipment.
and aciliu.. correctly defines human engineering; however, it specifies
human engineering as an activity which should be integrated with the total
system engineering effort versus as a component of the systems
engineering effort. In their definition of system engineering, human
engineering is not reflected. This elimination of human engineering as an
integral component of the systems engineering process might allow limited
or no scrutiny in the area of human factors. This discrepancy fosters an
impression that human engineering is possibly not a valid consideration in
certain systems. This impression could lead to system deficiencies which
cculd have been easily avoided in the early acquisition stages. A review
of each of the general human factors areas which compose the human
performance model follows.
1. Sensory Subsystem
Numerous sensory definitions are specified in Mil-Std 1472D.
Advisory signal, decibel, effective temperature, luminance- ratio, noise-
canceling, peak-clipping and wet bulb globe temperature are all used in
requirements dealing l with the sensory subsystem. The detailed
requirements, addressing the majority of sensory responses, are very
general.
Sufficient contrast shall be provided between the displayed
information and the display background to ensure that the required
information can be perceived by the operator under all expected
lighting conditions. (Mil-Std 1472D, 1989, p. 27)
A few expanding references do clarify some deficient areas.
The luminance contrast (See 3.17) within the indicator shall be at least
0.1. This 0.1 luminance contrast requirement does not apply to special
displays specifically designed for legibility in sunlight. For low
ambient illumination applications (e.g., Mil-L-25467), this ratio should
be at least 9.0 (See 3.17), 'with the background luminance less than
the figure luminance. (Mil-Std 1472D, 1989, p. 34)
However, overall the specifications dealing with the sensory subsystem are
very generic in nature and would be open to significant debate if 'made
directive upon a contractor. The only area seriously documenting the
sensory subsystem human factors is that of aircraft design. Many
specifications, which are very thorough, have been developed for
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implementation during aircraft procurement and development. Air Force
Systems Command Design Handbook (DH-1) titled Human Factors Engineering
clearly details the sensory requirements of military systems. Tolerance and
tolerance time of stress factors, outside the "comfort zone" include
descriptions of effects and limits. The following graphical representation
of these limits is an example of the myriad of figures used to detail the
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Figure 6. Human Hot Tolerance for Three Environmental Indices (DH-1,
1980, p. DN 3C2-1)
... Performing light work in a hot tolerance situation results in rising
skin temperature, followed by a rising body core temperature.
Vasodilation and sweating commence, but cannot completely compensate.
As the core temperature continues to rise the heart rate increases
and eventually may reach 70 beats per minute (or more) above normal.
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As his body continues to store heat, the individu'al (1) begins to lose
concentration or focus on a task, (2) becomes irritable or sick, and
(3) loses the desire to drink. With sudden postural changes, syncope
may occur. If not removed from the environment, the individual will
go into heat stroke (complete loss of thermo-regulation) after which
he will soon die. (DH-1, 1980, p. DN 3C2-1)
The effect of acoustical noise is addressed by DH-1. Speech
interference levels, noise criteria, sound levels, articulation index,
prediction intelligibility are all analyzed in detail. The decision for the use
of audio versus visual presentation is presented. For example,
... When information must be presented independently of the orientation
of the head: when a person's duties require him to move about or to
turn his head and body in different directions, visual presentation is
undesirable because of the possibility that he might miss some
important information or be so confined in his movements that his
performance is inefficient. (DH-1, 1980, p. PN 3F2-7)
As well, the other sensory response elements are discussed and graphed
for use in engineering of military systems. However, none of these
elements are specifically annotated for use in ADPE systems. It is up to
the designer to extrapolate from the document those items that are
applicable to the system.
Mil-Std 1472D sites as supplemental the following: Markings for
Aircrew Station Displays. Design and Confiwuration of: Aircrew Station
Controls and Displays for Rotary Wing Aircraft. Aircraft Station Vision
Re uirements for Military Aircraft. Acoustical Noise Limits in Helicopters.
Shipboard human factors considerations are limited to those addressing
safety such as: Walkway Compound. Nonslip and Walking Matting. Nonslip
and Airborne Sound Measurements and Acceptance Criteria of Shipboard
Equipmetg. The disparity in consideration of sensory subsystem human
factors in an ADPE environment is evident.
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2. Cognitive Information Processing
Just as the understanding of cognitive information processing.
was vague and fragmented so are the military, standards applicable to this
process. Mil-Std 1472D declares:
Military systems, equipment and facilities shall provide work
environments which foster effective safety and health, and which
minimize factors which degrade human performance or increase error.
Design shall be such that operator workload, accuracy, time
constraint' mnental ~processing and communications requirements do not
exceed operator capabilities. Design shall also minimize personnel and
training requirements within the limits of time, cost and performance
trade-offs. (Mil-Std 1472D, 1989, p.17)
It further clarifies that translation of information from one display into
another is not acceptable, since this is an area of possible error. Pattern
recognition is addressed as well as training. However, the remainder of
the military standard addresses the general procedures used to operate the
system, with no item specifically ad-dressing -bias, the limits of human
cognitive processing ability, information compression or memory storage.
3. Response Subsystem
The final area of the human factors considerations under the
human performance model, response subsystems, is thoroughly documented
in Mil-Std 1472D. Physical parameters for reach, touch, height, line of
- vision, etc. are numerically clarified for both males and females. Levels of
sound, levels of light, responses to warning indicators are all discussed.
Since these' factors are the easiest to measure, the thoroughness of the
military standard is not surprising.
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VII. A MANAGEMENT PLAN WITH RECOMMENDATIONS
The Department of Defense continues to invest millions of dollars in
ADPE as a response to mission requirements and diminished manning levels
produced by defense cutbacks. Maximum, utilization of this equipment is
necessary for both success in military goals as well as accomplishment of
routine tasks with limited manpower. In the combat environment,
successful operation of information display systems can only be assured
after the comprehensive. study of the effect of combat stress on the users,
of these systems. Deficiencies in system performance produced by the
effects of combat stress can then by identified and their causes corrected.
Only upon completion of these tasks can true assurances be given that
mission goals can be achieved successfully with a minimu m of loss of life
and equipment.
Studying the effects of combat stress could be accomplished through
simulations of combat environments: measurements could be recorded of the
deviations noted during the experiments. The results would give
documented proof that combat stress does impact the, main--machine initerface
of complex information display systems. However, this approach does not
address the orderly correction of, deficiencies required to preclude system
degradation due to, combat stress. Resolution would require a separate
project whose mission would have to be closely married to the -results of
the original investigation. Some of the 'implications discovered In the
original research could be lost/misconstrued in this transition.
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All branches of the service, currently have concerns about the effect
of combat 3tress on the users of their weapon systems. Each has
commenced some type of effort to address 'these concerns. Since this is
a military wide problem, a joint service approach to addressing the issues
is needed. This merging of talents would use the capabilities of each
service to its fullest, minimize redundant study and control cost. A prime
candidate to coordinate the efforts of this study would be the U.S. Army's
Materiel and Readiness Command who has already published guidelines "to
aid in the' inclusion of human factors considerations in the design of
Management Information Systems" (Hendricks, 1983, p. iii).
A comprehensive approach to determining the effects of combat'stress
would begin by defining the system users' baseline for physiological and
psychological requirements. This baseline would document thoroughly the
limitations of sensory and cognitive processes over which the user has no
control. Simulation or experiments would be developed with user baseline
requirements being met. These trials should be rigorously scrutinized for
experimental limitations and documented accordingly. The simulation should
address as closely as 'possible the various stressors inherent to the combat
environment. The research would be conducted using scientific
methodology to determine the effects of combat stress. The results should
then be documented in technical paper's which include recommendations for
resolution.'- Implementation of needed changes could then be accomplished
through modification. to the initially established user baseline military
standards and through modification of existing combat or organizational
doctrine. In conclusion, initial training on the effects 'of combat stress
would be initiated for Junior officers in their early training. Those in'
so
supervisory positions would need this information to successfully achieve
their mission objectives. Senior officers and those officers slated for
command positions would receive indepth training on the effects of combat
stress and the options available to them to minimize its effect.
A. THE DEFINITION OF USER CAPABILITIES
To address the effect of combat stres's on the man-machine interface
of complex information systems, it is first necessary to establish what the
normal performance of the user is. These levels of performance can only
be accepted as "unstressed" when the mean physiological and psychological
requirements of the user population are met. From this basis, the effects
of combat stress can be determined. As illustrated earlier, there exists
deficiencies in military documentation on both the physiological and
psychological requirements for users of information display systems.
Although numerous journals and texts delineate the anatomical,
cognitive, and sensory requirements of the, user's of ADPE, the military
establishment does not have a consolidated document that reflects these
*requirements. The Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command's
Human Enirineerine Guidelines for Manairement -Information S.Ystems
(Hendricks, 1983, pp. 1.1-10.7), which was jointly published by the Army
Management Information Directorate, And Human Engineering Laboratory, is
a cursory overview of the requirements for a comprehensive information'
display system. Although it presents well the basic needs to be considered.
in system design, it fails to expand the requirements to the level necessary
for the study of combat stress. or for the complete design %of an information
display system .The Army's military standard, Human Engineering D~esign
Criteria for Military Systems, Equipment and Facilities, is currently
supplemented by the Human Engineering Guide to Equipment Design with
more comprehensive documentation on the physiological capabilities and
requirements of system users. However, this cross reference system is
complicated and confusing and does not present the material in a clear,
concise manner that is readily available for use by the researcher or
systems designer.
The Air Force System Command Design Handbook (DH-1) has excellent
documentation for systems design; however, extrapolating the information
that is pertinent to the complex information display user from data that
appears to pertain to aircraft displays is a complex and time consuming
task. Each area does have similar requirements, however, much of the
documentation currently published in this handbook could be extracted for
ready use by researchers of combat stress and information display system
designers.
The format most understood by the system designer and the
requirements processor is the military standard. These documents are
concise and clearly written to facilitate their use in system design and
development. They could also be used as the basis for research in combat
stress.
It is recommended that the current documentation in Human
Entineerinr Requirements for Military Systems. Eauipment and Facilities'
and the supplemental information in the Human Enrineerinr Guide to
Equipment Design be compiled with extractions from the Systems Command
Desi2!n Handbook. If clarification 'or further research is necessary, the
requirements could be addressed by the Human Engineering Division,
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Armstrong Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory, Wright Patterson Air
Force Base, Ohio. This organization has provided much research in this
area with recent documentation of these contributions in the Handbook of
Perception and Human Performance. Volumes One and Two.
B. SIMULATION AND EXPERIMENTATION'
Currently, there exist rudimentary computer simulations which address
the impact of stress. Alphatech, Incorporated, of Burlington,
Massachusetts, in their study of "Information Gathering and Decision-
making Under Stress" have created the Team Optimal Stopping with
Communication Alternatives (TOSCA) program under prime contract N00014-
88-K-0545. However, close examination of this program reveals little
differentiation of types and intensity of stressors. Its use appears to be
for, educational purposes only--teaching the rudimentary concerts of the
limiting effects of stress to students. This program has been used
successfully in the teaching environment of the Naval Postgraduate School
with statistical analysis accomplished on the resulting data.
The Office of Naval Technology, with contributions from the Naval
Ocean Systems Center, San Diego, California and the Naval Training Systems
Center, Orlando, Florida, 'has commenced preparation for a study' on
"Tactical Decision-Making Under Stress". Their approach of simulation in
realistic operational scenarios is well suited for the research required to
determine the effects of combat stress. Research in task development
based in the research of the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the
Department of Defense and compiled by Fleishmann (Fleishmann, 1984, pp.
1-514) should be used to ensure the simulation is a comprehensive, orderly
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study. Inclusive documentdbtion on the limitations of the simulations would
assist in the analysis of the research data. With the addition of error
categorization and analysis as detailed by Jens "Rsmussen and James
Ready, cognitive processes that are inhibited by *the stressors could be
identified. Results of this research could be published as technical reports
with their corresponding, appropriate classifications. With these
modifications, serious consideration should be given to expanding the Office
of Naval Technology's current tasking to encompass the larger question at
hand.
With the return of military officers from the Persian Gulf War, a large
body of knowledge is available to researchers on stressors associated with
a combat environment. Many of these officers, a significant number of
whom deal with information display 3ystems, will be returning for follow on
education at the Air Force Institute of Technology and the Naval
Postgraduate School. The current experience of conflict is a wealth of
information that could be tapped in support of the resolution of the combat
stress question. Within the Naval Postgraduate School, there is a cadre
of experts in the human factors arena led by Gary K. Poock, PhD.,
Professor of Operations Research and Man-Machine Systems., Due to the
attendance by officers of all services at the Naval Postgraduate School and
the human factors expertise available there, it is recommended that the
Naval Postgraduate School undertake this survey and its associated
supporting analysis of data. It is further recommended that surveys of
these officers commence immediately to glean their perceptions of the types
and influence of stressors in the combat environment. This information
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could then be crossfed to researchers developing the simulation or
experimental models.
C. IMPLEMENTATION
The results from the combat stress research could be returned to the
Human Engineering Division, Armstrong Aerospace Medical Research
Laboratory, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Using the findings of
the study, the baseline military standards originally prepared by the
Human Engineering Division could be revised to include the appropriate
changes. These documents would then becoae the foundation for
equipment modification and design. If the resulting findings were also
forwarded to the Naval Postgraduate School, the Air Force Institute of
Technology and the Command and Staff colleges, appropriste operational
research and analysis could be accomplished to establish recommendations
for any needed changes in operational logistics and tactics.
Simultaneously, the studies of Karlene H. Roberts, of the University
of California-Berkeley, on High Reliability Organizations (Roberts, 1990, pp.
160-176), bear further scrutiny. The factors determined to positively
influence the military High Reliability Organizations should be implemented
to ensure maximum system performance and mission effectiveness. A
governmaent contract with this tasking should be considered. Review of'
her findings could then be developed by the aforementioned military
educational institutions which could then develop recommendatior or
necessary changes in military doctrine or tactics.
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS
The findings of the research on the effect. of combat stress will be
ineffective if they are not thoroughly documented, used in system design,
implemented in operational concepts, taught to personnel supervisors, and
incorporated in acquisition practices* Documentation, design and
operational concepts were addressed in implementation. Training and
acquisition recommendations are now given.
1. Training
To counteract the preconceptions, concerning the effects of
combat stress, exhibited by junior' officers, training on these factors
should begin early in the officers' career. As a supervisor of enlisted
personnel, a large number of whom use information display systems, this
knowledge is necessary for the effective utilization of personnel. Training
could be accomplished in conjunction with other supervisory training
received'by junior officers.
To ensure .senior officers and commanders have all the tools
necessary for mission accomplishiment,' comprehensive training on 'the
effects of ,combat stress should be accomplished at the appropriate
Command and Staff institution. Since command decision is often based
upon the inputs of information display -systems, the understanding of
possible system degradation is essential to the senior officer.
2. Acquisiton Practices
The problem faced by many acquisition personnel in the
Department of Defense today in a lack of sufficient military standards
detailing human factors for ADPE acquisition. The existing military
standards do cover a vast amount of the "tangible" elements but factors
regarding specifits such as the physiological and psychological attributes
are lacking. Due to limited crossfeed of ADPE acquisition problems, DOD
agencies do not have a comprehensive network for sharing common
problems in the area of ADPE acquisition. Therefore, errors in
procurement have a high probability of being repeated either due to acts
of omission or acts of commission. The existence of effective military
standards would save time, money, and lives.
One of the reasons that government-purchased equipment fails
to perform in accordance with specification is due to the lack of emphasis
on man-machine interface and its inherent constraints. Human factors must
be considered at every step of the acquisition process. The following gives
examples of each.
In the Mission Element Needs Statement (MENS), the mission
deficiency is thoroughly cited, alternative solutions must be given and
identification of associated costs detailed. The MENS should make human
factors an integral part of all considered alternatives. This is one of the
first documents that the organizational chain will review and it is
imperative Zhat this crucial factor be highlighted to upper 1 vel 'managers.
If applicable, lack of effective man-machine interface in the current system
should be cited as a reason for deficiency.
In the system decision papers, specific requirements for attention
to human factors should be cited in all milestone documentation. At each
of the milestones (separating the phases of procurement: initiation,
concept development, design, development, deployment, and operation),
evaluation should scrutinize the human factors challenged during that
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particular phase. For example, after the development phase is complete,
milestone checks should be made to evaluate whether personnel who are
representative of the user population were utilized for testing.
The most critical documentation for the implementation of human
factors in acquisition is the Statement of Work (SOW). The system
requirements must be written in such a way that it is made known to
contractors, in an unambiguous manner, that human factors are a key area
of concern. Established military standards must be cited--correctness of
military standard identification numbers should be verified. The SOW must
also contain a statement requiring the contractor to ensure that the human
factors effort is part of system engineering activities that define, develop,
integrate, and validate the system according to the requirements. A
mandatory Human Engineering Plan should be cited on the Contract Data
Requirements Listing and clarified as a Data Item Description. Specifically,
the SOW should direct the contractor to conduct a human factors program
addressing human engineering, biomedical factors, manpower and personnel,
simulation/equipment'for, training, and hum n factors' test and evaluation.
The criticality of human factors must be emphasized to the' contractor
frequently and the contractor must unders and that human factors design
criteria shall be considered in design of system components.
The SOW should dictate to contru ctors the requirement to have
human factors personnel participate in all system requirement and design
reviews. Contractors should establish procedures that ensure design
changes are incorporated in developmentsl prototypes, and in production
models of the information display systems. During the technical evaluation,
emphasis should remain on the human fact ors aspect of the contract and
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assurance should be obtained that criteria has not been altered or
changed.
The human factors aspect of ADPE acquisition is extremely
challenging and difficult. However, if we are to insure the successful
implementation of our systems, we must scrutinize the application of human
factors to the design and production of our systems. Only after successful
operational test and evaluation of these "human sensitive" systems, under
near real world battle conditions, will we be assured of true system
effectiveness.
E. CONCLUSIONS
Research currently available in the field of stress and cognition
reveals that stress has a definite impact on the performance of system
users. Very little research has been conducted on combat stress.,
Understanding the impact of combat stress and its subsequent degradation
of system performance is rapidly becoming a serious concern to military
commanders. Advanced technology, smaller theaters of operation, shorter
periods of time for decision-making are all factors in this situation. This
management plan is offered as a proposal to facilitate dete~rmining' the
effects of combat stress on the man-machine interface of complex
information display systems. The leading edge of technology is upon us
and we now must address our successful use of that leading edge.
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